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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
THE AMERICAN OIL COMPANY,
a Maryland Corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
GENERAL CONTRACTING CORP.,
a Utah corporation; FEDERAL INSURANCE CO., a corporation; and UNITED
STATES STEEL CORPORATION, a New
Jersey corporation,
Defendants and Respondents.

No. 10326

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action by a supplier of materials which were
ordered by and delivered to a subcontractor of the general
contractor of a State Road Commission contract. Said supplier seeks to recover from the general contractor and its
surety.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After default judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff
against the insolvent subcontractor, the case was heard by
the trial court on cross motions for summary judgment. The
court granted the motion of the general contractor and its
surety, and plaintiff appeals.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 4, 1961, the State Road Commission of
Utah entered into a construction contract with the defendant-respondent, United States Steel Corporation, the general
contractor, hereinafter referred to as, "U. S. Steel," for the
construction of a bridge in Daggett County, Utah. U. S.
Steel furnished the contract bond required by and provided
in the usual form by the State Road Commission, which
bond was issued by defendant-respondent, Federal Insurance
Co., hereinafter referred to as the "Surety." Between December 11, 1961, and December 10, 1962 ( R-33,34 ), plaintiffappellant, The American Oil Company, hereinafter called
"Plaintiff," supplied materials used on the project to the
defendant General Contracting Corp., a subcontractor of
U. S. Steel, hereinafter called the "Subcontractor."
The Subcontractor did not contest that it owed Plaintiff
$3,773.00 and allowed default judgment to be entered
against it for this amount (R-16). Effective as of May 14,
1963, the Utah Legislature amended Chapter 1 of Title 14,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, by repealing sections 14-1-1
through 14-1-4 (hereinafter called the "old statute"), and
added 14-1-5 through 14-1-9, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
hereinafter called the "new statute." Both the old and the
new statute deal with public contractors' bonds.
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The contract and bond executed by U. S. Steel and its
Surety were executed on October 4, 1961 before repeal of
the old statute and enactment of the new.
Under the old statute no notice of any kind was required
to be given to a general contractor by a materialman of a
subcontractor (such as plaintiff) prior to filing suit, and the
event controlling when suit upon the bond could be timely
filed was "the completion and final settlement of the contract." The old statute contains a special statute of limitations requiring that suit on the bond "must be commenced
within one year thereafter," (In other words, one year after
"the completion and final settlement") Section 14-1-2, UCA
1953.
The only disputed fact in this case concerns when "the
completion and final settlement" of the contract occurred.
The Road Commission's agent advised Plaintiff by affidavit
that this was May 21, 1963 ( R-35, R-46). However, this is
denied by U.S. Steel (Parag~tph 5, R-26), which relies on a
supplemental affidavit ( R-S}sfgned by the same person employed by the Road Commission. A subsequent third affidavit ( R-46) was filed by this same employee to further
clarify the validity of the May 21, 1963 date. This dispute
is immaterial under Plaintiff's contention that it is a third
party beneficiary of the general contract.
Under the new statute, "Every suit instituted on the
aforesaid payment bond" is subject to a special statute of
limitations which specifies
that no such suit shall be commenced after the expiration of one year from the date on which the claimant
. . . furnished or supplied the last of the materials.
( 14-1-6, emphasis added.)
The next clause also provides that any claimant, such as
plaintiff, that did not have a contractual relationship with
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the general contractor
shall not have a right of action upon such payment
bond unless he has given written notice to such contractor within ninety days from the date on which
such claimant . . . furnished or supplied the last of
the material ( 14-1-6, emphasis added ) .
In other words, the new statute would have required
Plaintiff to give U. S. Steel notice on or before March 9,
1963, ( 90 days after December 10, 1962), although the new
statute did not become law until May 14, 1963; also, Plaintiff's suit would have to be filed more than five months sooner
than under the old statute, or by December 9, 1963, instead
of May 20, 1964. If U.S. Steel is correct that "the completion
and final settlement" of the contract occurred prior to May
16, 1963, Plaintiff's statutory rights (as distinguished from
contractual rights) under the old statute against the surety
would be barred because Plaintiff commenced the instant
proceedings by filing its complaint on May 15, 1964 ( R-8-A,
reverse). No prior written notice was ever given to U. S.
Steel by plaintiff of its claim. Plaintiff's Complaint makes no
reference to the new statute, but paragraph 9 of the Complaint ( R-2) alleges that U. S. Steel and its Surety owe
Plaintiff $3,773.00 pursuant to the contract and bond executed by U.S. Steel and its Surety with the State Road Commission. The bond, incorporated and made a part of the
contract by reference, provides that U. S. Steel
shall also pay or cause to be paid all claims of .. ·
any other person or persons who supply . . . any of
the subcontractors of the principal ( R-4, 5).

The trial court prepared and filed the following memorandum decision:
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for
hearing on the 20th day of January, 1965, at the hour
of 9:00 o'clock, A.M. on plaintiff's motion for sum-

r
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mary judgment and on defendants' motion for summary judgment.
The matter was argued and submitted and the
Court being fully advised in the premises finds that
defendants' motion for summary judgment should be
granted for the following reasons:
tiff;

1. That the plaintiff is not a proper party plain-

2. That said action should have been filed in
Daggett County; and
3. That said action was not filed within the
time required by the statute.
Dated: January 23, 1965. ( R-48)

POINT I
THE CONTRACTORS' BOND STATUTE IS
NOT THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY OF PLAINTIFF.
Neither the old statute nor the new statute constitute
the exclusive remedy of an unpaid materialman in an action
against a general contractor.

In paragraph 9 of the Complaint ( R-2) as one of the
grounds of its action against U. S. Steel, Plaintiff seeks to
recover as a third party beneficiary under the construction
contract between U. S. Steel and the State Road Commission. By the terms of the contract (R-4, R-5) U. S. Steel
agreed to pay materialmen of subcontractors who had supplied materials to the project. Plaintiff was such a materialman, and it has a nonstatutory right based on contract to sue
U. S. Steel for payment under the construction contract.

6

Plaintiff's contract action against U. S. Steel is separate and
apart from any rights which plaintiff may have under the
statute against the Surety.
Both the old and the new statutes provided remedies
and rights for claimants upon the bond and against the
surety only. These statutes require that a bond be furnished.
Neither requires a contract. Both describe generally the
type of bond and then go on to set forth the rights and
remedies of laborers and materialmen in actions upon the
bonds.
It is submitted that the Legislature was speaking of
suits on bonds only; there is no provision respecting suits
on construction contracts. An indication of the purpose and
intent of the statutes is found in the Title to the new statute,
Chapter 15, Laws of Utah, 1963, which also repealed the old:

An Act to provide for the Bonding of Contractors for
Public Buildings . . . and to Repeal Sections . . .
Relating to Bonding Requirements on Public Contracts . . .
Pertinent language from the two statutes are quoted:
In the old statute, Section 14-1-2, supra, the following
phrases are used: "action .. on the bond," "only one action
shall be brought upon said bond" and "forever barred from
recovery upon such bond." In the new statute, Section
14-1-6, supra, the following appear: "shall have the right
to sue on such payment bond," and "Every suit instituted on
the aforesaid payment bond."
These statutes relate only to the requirement of furnishing bonds and rights and actions thereupon. They do not
require construction contracts; and they provide no remedies
or actions upon such contracts. They were enacted for the
protection and benefit of obligees, creditors, and sureties and
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not for the protection of contractors, as stated in State v.
Campbell Building Co. ( 1938 Utah) 77 P. 2d 341, where
the Court discussed the application of the old statute:
It may aid in understanding to bear in mind that
this statute deals only with actions against the surety.
Claims of creditors against the contractor are not
affected by the statute. 'Ve opine such claims may be
asserted at any time tvithin the general statute of lim- .
itations. It is only when it is sought to hold the surety
- only when recovery is to be made under the bond that the provisions of the statute come into play. The
restrictions are two-fold: To give the obligee a priority to determine and protect any claim it may have,
and to fix a one year limitation on the surety's liability
to other creditors ... The statute is not for the benefit
of the contractor but for the benefit of the obligee,
creditors, and surety. (Emphasis added)

POINT II
PLAINTIFF, AS A THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY UNDER THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT, IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT
AGAINST U. S. STEEL.
By the terms of the construction contract between the
State Road Commission and U. S. Steel, the latter agreed
to pay materialmen of subcontractors who had supplied
materials on the project. The contract provides:

WITNESSETH, That for and in consideration of payments, hereinafter mentioned, to be made by the
Commission, the Contractor agrees to furnish all labor
and equipment; to furnish and deliver all materials
... in the construction of ( 1) Steel Arch Bridge.
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The contract further provided:
The said plans and specifications and the notice to
contractors, instruction to bidders, the proposal, special provisions, and contract bond, are hereby made a
part of this agreement as fully and to the same effect
as if the same had been set forth at length herein.
(Emphasis added, R-4).

t

U. S. Steel did provide a bond, R-5, which ls executed as
principal and this bond became a part of the contract by
reference and its terms became the terms of the contract. It
provided in part as follows:
NOW THEREFORE, if the above bonded principal
as contractor ... shall also pay or cause to be paid
all claims of subcontractors, laborers, mechanics, materialmen, ranchmen, farmers, merchants, and any
other person or persons who supply the principal or
any of the subcontractors of the principal with labor,
work, material, ranch, or farm products. provisions.
goods and supplies of any kind including tools, machinery, and equipment to the extent of their use
and depreciation on this contract; and shall pay all
just debts incurred therefor, in carrying on such work
... then this obligation shall be null and void, otherwise it shall remain in full force and effect. ( Emphasis added, R-5).
Construing the contract as a whole, U. S. Steel had
specifically agreed to pay the claims of materialmen, including materialmen of subcontractors. Plaintiff was such a
materialman, having supplied materials to Subcontractor.
Aside from any rights which Plaintiff might have under the
Contractor's Bond statutes, U. S. Steel is liable to the Plaintiff on the contract on ordinary principles of contract law.
Under the construction contract, Plaintiff, as a materialman, was a third party beneficiary (creditor beneficiary).
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Corbin on Contracts, Vol. 4, Sections 779 - and 787. Utah
has long recognized the doctrine and right of third party
beneficiaries and has applied the doctrine in favor of laborers
and materialmen. The principle was stated in Brown v.
Markland, 16 Utah 360, 52 P. 597. There the plaintiff, a
materialman, sued for materials furnished in connection with
the operation of a mine. One Frailey had entered into a
contract to sell the mine to defendant and by the terms
thereof defendant was to assume and pay claims of materialmen. The contract did not state who the materialmen were.
On appeal the Supreme Court affirmed in favor of the materialman and quoted from the earlier case of Montgomery
v. Spencer, 15 Utah 495, 50 P. 623:
. . . where a promise or contract has been made between two parties for the benefit of a third, an action
will lie thereon at the instance and in the name of
the party to be benefitted. although the promise or
contract was made without his knowledge, and without any consideration moving from him.
The doctrine has been approved and reaffirmed in later
Utah cases. Smith v. Bowman, 32 Utah 33-39, 88 P. 687;
Blyth-Fargo Co. v. Free ( 1915 Utah) 148 P. 427; M. H.
Walker Realty Co. v. American Surety Co. ( 1922 Utah)
211 P. 998; and DeLuxe Glass Co. v. Martin, ( 1949 Utah)
208 P. 2d 1127.
See-also Corbin on Contracts, Vol. 4, Sections 775 and
788. Section 779 J, pp. 60, 61 of the latter work contains a
discussion of the relationship and rights of laborers and
materialmen as affected by the federal contractors' bond
statute, the Miller Act. 40 USCA Section 270. The following is quoted from that work:
Those who supply labor and materials to such a subcontractor are creditor beneficiaries of the principal
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contractor's promise. As such beneficiaries, they are
in a 'contractual relationship' with him just as clearly
as if they had sold their labor and materials directly
to him.
The bond, in which the surety promises an owner
that laborers and materialmen shall be paid, creates
a 'contractual relationship' between them and the
surety; and if the principal contractor promises either
the owner or a subcontractor that they shall be paid,
a similar 'contractual relationship' is created between
them and the principal contractor.
The rights of a third party beneficiary under a contract
are established once it is shown that the contract necessarily
and directly benefits him. DeLuxe Glass Company v. Martin,
supra. The intention of the parties to this construction contract were unmistakably clear. The provisions, quoted above,
contain an express promise by U. S. Steel to the State Road
Commission to pay materialmen including materialmen of
subcontractors.
Plaintiff's action against U. S. Steel on the contract was
timely filed because this cause was not necessarily based on
either the old or the new statute. As stated in State v.
Campbell Building Co., ( 1938 Utah), 77 P. 2d 341, 344:
The statute is not for the benefit of the contractor but
for the benefit of the obligee, creditors, and surety.
Earlier in the same decision the court held (page 344):
... this statute deals only with actions against the
surety. Claims of creditors against the contractor are
not affected by the statute. We opine such claims may
be asserted at any time within the general statute of
limitations.
This suit, founded upon the written conb·act was timely
filed, and would fall within the general statute of limitations.
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Section 78-12-23, UCA 1953. The court erred in holding that
Plaintiff's action was not filed soon enough,
The only difference to Plaintiff if recovery for Plaintiff
is awarded under the third party beneficiary contract doctrine, rather than under the Contractor's Bonds Statute, is
that Plaintiff would not be entitled to statutory attorney
fees under Section 14-1-4.

POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN FILED
IN DAGGETT COUNTY.
In its Memorandum Decision, the Trial Court held that
the action should have been filed in Daggett County (R-48).
Plaintiff's suit was filed in the District Court of Salt Lake
County. The old statute, Section 14-1-2, UCA 1953, in effect
when suit was filed, provided in pertinent part: "... any
person who has supplied labor or materials ... may sue ...
in any court having jurisdiction in the County where the
contract was to be performed, ..." This is a venue requirement; it is not jurisdictional. 17 Am Jur and 295, Contractors'
Bonds, Section 116.
The federal contractors' bonds statute, The Miller Act,
40 USCA Section 270 (b ), contains a similar provision:
"... every suit instituted under this section shall be brought
in ... the United States District Court for any district in
which the contract was to be performed and executed and
not elsewhere ... "
The Federal Courts have construed the above provision
to be a venue requirement and not one of jurisdiction. See
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Texas Construction Company vs. United States ( 1956) 236
F. 2d 138. In that case the appellants, contractors, contended that the district court which tried the case was without jurisdiction because the contract was performed in another district. In its opinion the court said:
Both parties here concede that, upon proper motion,
the defendant in a case brought in a district other
than that in which the contract was to be performed
could require a dismissal of the action as being in the
wrong venue. Appellants also concede that if the
Court holds this to be a venue statute rather than one
affecting jurisdiction of the Court, then their failure
to move by timely motion to attack the venue would
be fatal to their cause here.
The trial court had overruled all pleas asserting lack of jurisdiction. The Circuit Court affirmed on the ground that the
statute was a restriction only on venue rather than on the
power of the court to entertain the suit. It also said:
On this ground also we feel that the requirement as
to the district in which suit may be filed, contained
in the Miller Act, is only one for the benefit of the
defendants and may thus be waived by them, as may
any other question of venue.
To the same effect see U. S. for Use of Mitchell Bros.
Truck Lines v. Jen-Mar Constr. Co., 223 F. Supp. 646, and
U. S. to Use of Bailey-Lewis-Williams of Fla. Inc. vs. Peter
Kiewit Sons of Canada, 195 F. Supp. 752, affirmed, 299
F 2d 930.

If defendants had wanted the case tried in Daggett
County their remedy was to have moved for a change of
venue by responsive pleading early in the proceeding. Section 78-13-8, UCA 1953. Having failed to do so they waived
all right in this regard.
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Of course under Plaintiff's third party beneficiary claim,
Salt Lake County and not Daggett County, is the proper
venue.

POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT A PROPER
PARTY PLAINTIFF.
The trial court in its Memorandum Decision ( R-48)
held that the plaintiff was not a proper party plaintiff.
The old statute, Section 14-1-2, UCA 1953, provided:
. any person who has supplied labor or materials . . .
may sue the contractor and his surety, for his own benefit,
in the name of the obligee, ... " This provision was permissive and not mandatory; was a procedural requirement, and
was not jurisdictional. Failure to comply with the provision
constituted no bar to plaintiff's suit.
A similar problem arose in the Utah case Board of Education vs. Southern Surety Co. ( 1930 Utah) 287 P. 332.
There, a materialman who had supplied materials to a contractor on a public school building, brought suit against the
contractor and the surety. The statute, a predecessor of the
present statute, required that in all suits personal notice of
the pendency of such suits shall be given to all known creditors and that notice by publication in a newspaper should
be made for three successive weeks. There the defendants
contended that the publication of the notice did not meet
the above requirements. The Supreme Court held that the
requirement was not jurisdictional, saying:
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Even if it should be conceded that the appellant is
right in its contention that the notice was not published for the full period of time contemplated by the
statute, it could not be heard to complain on that account. The giving of the notice is not jurisdictional.
The court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and
of the parties served with process independent of the
notice. No claim is made that there are any claims
for material furnished in the construction of the
school building other than that of Frank M. Allen
Company. If there are any such claims they are, and
at the time of the trial of this cause in the court below
were, forever barred from enforcing such claims
against the appellant, and therefore it can in no way
be prejudiced because the notice was not published
for a longer period of time.
The trial court erred in determining that the plaintiff
was not a proper party plaintiff. Plaintiff was the real party
in interest and the failure to sue in the name of the state
constituted no prejudice whatever to defendants.
The new statute contains no such provision and under
the third party contract doctrine has no possible application
to this case, the trial judge's decision to the contrary (R-48),
notwithstanding.

POINT V
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PLAINTIFF'S ACTION WAS NOT FILED
WITHIN THE TIME REQUIRED BY THE
STATUTE.
In addition to Plaintiff's rights against U. S. Steel on the
construction contract, discussed under Point II, above, Plain-
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tiff is entitled to judgment on the bond against both U. S.
Steel and the Surety on the basis of the old statute, Section
14-1-2, UCA 1953, and the trial court erred in holding that
Plaintiff's action was not filed within the time required by
the statute.
As heretofore stated, Plaintiff was a material.man having
furnished materials to Subcontractor on the construction
project and as a material.man was entitled to sue on the bond.
Plaintiff furnished the last materials on or before December
10, 1962, and the final settlement date of the contract was
May 21, 1963. The old statute, then in force, provided that
suit must be commenced within one year after the date of
complete performance and final settlement of the contract.
Plaintiff's suit was filed on May 15, 1963, within one
year of the settlement date and within the time limit set by
the old statute.
Effective May 14, 1963, the old statute was repealed
and the new statute enacted. The latter contained two significant procedural changes affecting suits upon contractors'
bonds. The first required materialmen of subcontractors to
give the general contractor 90 days written notice prior to
suit; the second changed the limitation period for filing suits
by requiring that suits be filed within one year from the date
on which the last material was furnished.
Under the factual circumstances of this case, Plaintiff
could not possibly have complied with the procedural requirements of the new statute. The 90-day period as applied
to Plaintiff had already expired by the time the new statute
was enacted. The changed limitation period for filing suit
had shortened the time within which Plaintiff could file by
five months.
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The Contractors' Bonds statutes as they permit suits by
materialmen are highly remedial, and must, in furtherance
of justice, receive a liberal construction and application so
as to accomplish their real objective and purpose. Mellon v.
Vondor-Horst Bros., 44 Utah 300, 140 P. 130. It would be a
denial of justice to deny Plaintiff the right to recover under
either the old or the new statute.
Plaintiff's rights on the bond arose under the old statute
which was law when the construction contract was executed
and when Plaintiff delivered the last materials. These rights
had accrued and should not be affected by repeal of the
statute.
The claim of the plaintiff below for half pilotage
fee, resting upon a transaction regarded by the law
as a quasi contract, there is no just ground for the
position that it fell with the repeal of the statute under which the transaction was had. When a right has
arisen upon a contract, or a transaction in the nature
of a contract, authorized by statute, and has been so
far perfected that nothing remains to be done by the
party asserting it, the repeal of the statute does not
affect it, or an action for its enforcement. It has become a vested right which stands independent of the
statute. Pacific M.S.S. Co. v. lollife, 2 Wall 450.
In Chism v. Phelps ( 1958 Ark) 311 S. W. 2d 297, the
Arkansas Supreme Court had before it a personal injury action involving the effect of repeal of a comparative negligence statute. The Court said:
As the New Hampshire court stated in the case of
In re Opinion of the Justices, supra (89 N.H. 563,
198 A. 250); The repeal of a statute renders it thenceforth inoperative, but it does not undo or set aside
the consequences of its operation while in force, unless such a result is directed by express language or
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necessary implication. A status established in a manner which becomes proscribed is not lost by the mere
fact of the proscription.
Even as here, where no question of vested rights
is involved, the presumption is that the repeal of an
act does not invalidate the accrued results of its
operative tenure. To undo such results by a repeal is
to give it retroactivity, and based upon elemental
principals of justice a rule of construction avoids that
effect if the language of the repeal does not clearly
require it.
The same reasoning applies to the instant case. Plaintiff
should be allowed to recover against U. S. Steel and its
surety under the old statute.
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CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court should be reversed and
judgment be entered in favor of plaintiff against U. S. Steel
because the trial court failed to recognize Plaintiff's contractual rights as a third party beneficiary of the construction contract. Plaintiff should also be entitled to recover
under the Contractors' Bond statute from both U. S. Steel
and Federal Insurance Co., its surety, because it would be a
denial of justice to deny Plaintiff the right to recover under
the facts of this case. The trial Court was in error in holding
( 1) that Plaintiff is not a proper party plaintiff; ( 2) that
said action should have been filed in Daggett County; and
( 3) that said action was not filed within the time required
by the statute.
Respectfully submitted,
WAYNE C. DURHAM and GARY L. THEURER
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
The American Oil Company
428 American Oil Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

